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Abstract
The paper examines a decision and risk, analysis approach applied to
a new product and facilities planning problem.* The discussion describes
the risk analysis process, and presents the step-by-step approach used by
the project team. The initial results of the analysis are presented and
are discussed by the team in a process of policy dialogue. It is shown
that the project team questioned a number of project assumptions, parti-
cularly in the marketing area, and expressed concern about the perceived
vagueness of CCA's objectives. The output of the dialogue process finally
led to a strategy recommendation for Egg'N Foam, following an examination
of the relationship of the Egg'N Foam project to the firm's long-term
strategy path.
*This problem is somewhat disguised in regard to project chronology
and magnitudes of input data but the problem structure and new product
area is unaltered.

INTRODUCTION
The paper discusses the role of risk analysis in relation to the
Egg N'Foam project—a potential investment opportunity in the plastic
egg carton market. The paper illustrates the step-by-step nature of
the application of risk analysis [see Hertz and Thomas [4]] and also
show the procedures adopted at each stage. In subsequent sections of
this paper, we will develop the problem structure in flow diagram form,
state the problem assumptions, perform an initial sensitivity analysis,
develop investment alternatives, assign subjective probabilities, pre-
sent the results of the risk analysis, demonstrate the process of policy
dialogue about the strategy to be chosen, and summarize our conclusions.
The decision alternatives under consideration ranged from abandon-
ment (which would involve the loss of the pilot plant) to expansion
strategies (involving larger plants—so called "superplants"—and a
series of small plants).
The risk analysis approach involved three sets of people. The
management group at CCA, the CCA project team (charged with the respon-
sibility for project evaluation), and the consultants (providing tech-
nical expertise and guidance). The most interesting element in the
process involved the dialogue about choice and implementation which
developed between the project team and management group at CCA.
THE CCA COMPANY'S EGG'N FOAM PROJECT
The Egg'N Foam project at CCA represented a large investment, a
totally new market area, and a completely new product for CCA. For
several years CCA had been developing Egg'N Foam, a plastic package as
a competitive substitute for paper egg cartons, refining its product
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design and operating a pilot plant in Nesquehoning, Pennsylvania. The
project involved substantial amounts of uncertainty.
The project team selected to work, on the Egg'N Foam decision con-
sisted of representatives from the Research and Development Division,
Plastics Division, and Corporate Controller's Office. Those involved
had been associated with the Egg'N Foam project for a considerable
period of time, and were quite familiar with the development, production,
and marketing aspects of this project.
The following section discusses the step-by-step approach used by
the project team to study the attractiveness of investing more funds in
Egg'N Foam.
THE RISK ANALYSIS PROCESS
DEVELOPING THE FLOW CHART
AND PROBLEM STRUCTURE
The first step in applying risk analysis to Egg'N Foam was to
construct a flow chart of the investment analysis. The process started
with an assessment of basic economics of the investment project,
entering each element in a simple chart. The initial Egg'N Foam flow
chart shown in Chart 1 consisted of six elements representing: (1) the
total market size for egg cartons, (2) CCA's foam market share, (3)
selling price, (4) manufacturing cost, (5) total overheads, and (6)
investment base.
The initial flow chart was then expanded backward to encompass a
large set of input factors. This involved establishing a value for
each factor, analyzing the determinants of that value, questioning the
validity of the determining factors, and where possible, exploding the
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elements into further detail. The final product was a flow diagram of
all the factors relevant to determining the profitability of Egg'N Foam.
The final flow chart for Egg'N Foam is considerably more detailed
than the initial chart (Exhibit I). The manufacturing costs, overhead
costs, and investment base, were expanded into a substantial number of
inputs. However, the unavailability of sufficient market data limited
the amount of analysis which could be undertaken on the marketing ele-
ments (i.e., market size,* market share, and price).
STATING THE ASSUMPTIONS
When the flow chart was completed, assumptions underlying each of
the factors were stated explicitly. This step was particularly impor-
tant because it placed a limit on the amount of detail required to
substantiate the data inputs. For example, if the project team assumed
CCA would capture a 10 percent share of the carton market, little data
would be needed to estimate CCA's sales volume. As this assumption
demonstrates, however, the magnitude that assumptions can take reveals
the need to verify their reliability. Invalid assumptions can result
in misleading and inaccurate conclusions from investment analysis.
Thus, verification of assumptions is an integral and important part of
the phase of stating the assumptions.
*For the purpose of this study, the total market for egg cartons
has been divided into five regions. Each represents a market that
could be covered by the output from one Egg'N Foam plant. The West
Coast was excluded from the analysis because entering this market was
considered to be a separate decision not related to building plants in
the other four regions. Egg'N Foam cartons cannot be shipped to the
West Coast as the freight costs are too high.
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On the Egg'N Foam project, the team was able to verify the validity
of most of the data. This included information such as equipment rates,
supplied by Research and Development Division personnel, and forecasts
of total egg production, supplied by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
With some data, however, it was felt that further study was necessary
to determine the accuracy of the data and assumptions. In particular
this included the percentage of eggs cartoned, and Egg'N Foam sales
volume and price. Exhibit II lists all of the assumptions underlying
the most important input factors of the flow chart.
ANALYZING SENSITIVITY
The next step in the analysis was to construct a nonprobabilistic
computer model of the flow chart, using the basic data shown in Exhibit
III. The model was built for a single plant, as each region represented
a similar size market that would support a single plant operation. The
model performed all the calculations indicated by the flow chart, and
provided answers in terms of the return on investment and cash flows.
The model was also used to determine the sensitivity of investment
returns and cash flows to changes in input variables. The team was
quickly able to answer questions such as: "What would happen to the
discounted rate of return if the price dropped by $0.50 per thousand
cartons?" or "What would happen if the thermoformer cycle time were
improved to 4-1/2 seconds?". The results of the sensitivity analyses
on Egg'N Foam are shown in Chart 2. Changes in two factors—caliper
(or thickness) and demand—had a dramatic effect on the rate of return,
whereas changes in the value of other factors had only minor impact on
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CHART 2
SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT RETURN
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profitability. The high sensitivity of the investment return to changes
in caliper and demand indicated the extreme importance of the accuracy
of the assumed sales volume of Egg'N Foam.
The sensitivity analysis was also valuable because it permitted the
team to experiment on the computer with different equipment combina-
tions, and plant sizes, to identify the optimal plant operation. When
applied to Egg'N Foam, the sensitivity analysis suggested that one
extruder could support two thermoformers instead of one the rmo former,
and also demonstrated the feasibility of building larger plants con-
taining two extruders and four thermoformers.
DEVELOPING INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVES
After the sensitivity analysis was performed, the single plant
model was used as a building block in constructing investment strate-
gies for Egg'N Foam.* The team developed four alternative strategies
for CCA in the egg carton market. Two strategies involved building
superplants, each containing two extruders and four thermoformers; the
other two strategies called for small plants, each containing one
extruder and two thermoformers.
The difference between the two superplant strategies** and the two
small plant strategies is speed of market entry. One of the superplant
strategies and one of the small plant strategies represent a slow, con-
servative investment pace, requiring the addition of thermoformers only
*The appendix lists the input data that were used for each strategy.
**Superplant strategy assumes construction of two plants to serve
the four regions, while the small plant strategy assumes construction
of four plants.
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after the demand for the output of existing equipment is firmly estab-
lished. Conversely, the other strategies assume that CCA would act as
quickly as possible to acquire equipment, hire and train the necessary
manpower, and open the plants. The four strategies are shown in Chart 3,
expressed in terms of the timing and sequence of equipment installation
by plant location.
ASSIGNING THE PROBABILITIES
The team's next step was to obtain probability information on input
factors. Subjective probabilities were developed for the five inputs
of the model that had either a significant impact on profitability, or
a considerable degree of uncertainty: extruder rate, thermoformer
cycle time, caliper, price, and demand.
The probability distributions in Exhibit IV represent the best judg-
ment of the CCA personnel most knowledgeable about Egg'N Foam. To pro-
vide a better understanding of the graphs shown in the exhibit, the
following discussion highlights the important characteristics of each
probability distribution.
Extruder Rate
Information from CCA's production specialists, as well as from out-
side extruder manufacturers, indicated that extruders brought to the
market after 1970 would have higher throughput rates due to advances
in design. Therefore, two probability curves were developed; one for
the period 1968 to 1970, and the other for the years 1970 to 1975.
The width of both distributions is rather tight around the expected
value for each distribution. This implies that CCA personnel were con-
fident that the extruders would operate at the expected pounds of
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foam per hour. Furthermore, the shapes of the extruder probability
curves are almost identical, indicating that the CCA representatives had
the same amount of confidence in the performance of existing and future
extruder designs.
Thermoformer Cycle Time
The same advances are expected for the thermoformers. Improved
equipment should be available by 1971, so two different probability
distributions were necessary. The first one covers the years 1968 to
1970, and ranges from 6.0 to 4.5 seconds with an expected value of 5.3.
The distribution for the 1971 to 1975 thermoformer design ranges from
a 6.0- to 3.0-second cycle time, with an expected value of 4.2 seconds.
The shapes of the two curves differ, however, because CCA personnel had
greater confidence in the performance of 1968 equipment compared to that
expected of future thermoformer designs.
Caliper
Similarly, two probability distributions were developed for the
thickness of foam sheets to be processed by thermoformers, as shown in
Exhibit IV. In this case, however, CCA production personnel were less
confident in their predictions. The probability distribution shows
that the caliper could fall anywhere between .090 and .078 inches thick-
ness with equal likelihood. The flatness and width of both probability
curves indicate the lack of confidence in CCA's ability to produce foam
of uniform caliper.
Price
The project team developed probability distributions for price in
each of the years between 1968 and 1975, and predicted the expected
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value would drop $0.30 per thousand cartons each year. The probability
distributions for three of the seven years are shown in Exhibit IV, and
are representative of the remaining price curves.
Demand
Estimates of demand were developed for each strategy, for each
plant, and for each year (the base data for means and standard devia-
tions are shown in the appendix), based on the assumption that CCA can
capture 10 percent of the egg carton market or 360 million cartons* by
197 A with the fast strategy, or, by 1978 with the slow strategy. For
the fast strategy, there is a greater probability of deviation from the
expected demand than for the slow strategy.
RESULTS OF THE "FIRST PASS" RISK ANALYSIS
Exhibit V shows the logical flow chart for the risk analysis simu-
lation. This was used as the basis for the "first-pass" evaluation of
each of the alternative strategies. The results of the analysis are
shown in summary form in Table I below:
Table I
RESULTS IN TERMS OF NPV
RISK-ANALYSIS NPV SUCH THAT
POINT SIMULATION ($M.) 95% PROBABILITY
ESTIMATE STANDARD PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING
STRATEGY C$M.) MEAN DEVIATION (NPV > 0) THAT VALUE ($M.)
1 4.12 3.53 0.84 0.99 2.0
2 0.85 0.74 0.45 0.94
3 2.90 0.94 1.37 0.88 -2.0
4 -1.38 -1.70 0.68 -3.0
NOTES FOR a) Discount rate In simulati<Dn calculation is assumed at 5%
TABLES net-of--tax, i. e., the riskless rate.
b) Point estimate calculation made using most likely values
for each input variable and CCA's appropriate net-of-tax
risk-adjusted rate of return.
c) Strategy 1 = super-fast; strategy 2 = super-slow;
strategy 3 = small-fast; strategy 4 = small-slow.
*The 360 million cartons represent a 10% share of the market in
four regions: East, Southeast, Midwest, and Southwest.
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Chart 4 shows the cumulative density functions (CDF's) for net present
value for each of the strategies.
The performance measures shown in Table I are calculated in rela-
tion to the discounted return on investment measure, net present value.
Columns 4 and 5 present two possible choice criteria for each strategy.
These are the probability that the net present value is positive, and
also that the value of NPV is such that there is a 95% probability of
exceeding that value. Using these criteria, it would appear that
strategy 4 could be eliminated immediately.
In addition, using principles of stochastic dominance, it would
also appear that Strategy 1 dominates all other strategies. Therefore,
strategy 1 is recommended. However, as a contingency plan, strategy 2
is the next best alternative, if, in the first four years, the market
growth projections are revised downwards considerably.
Policy Dialogue
Following the initial risk analysis, the dialogue about strategy
choice between the project and management teams at CCA focussed around
two main concerns. Although it was agreed that the sensitivity and
risk analyses had aided the process of strategy formulation, it did not
lead to a clear-cut strategy choice. Much controversy centered around
the inadequacy of the processes of problem identification (including
key assumptions), and the lack of specificity and clarity about CCA's
objectives. The strategic issues raised are outlined in subsequent
paragraphs
.
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Problem Identification
Typical critical comments from management included:
"The team seems to have considered heavily techno-
logically oriented strategies, i.e., concentration
on plant size and speed of introduction for the
product. Little emphasis was placed on interpreting
the demand picture, which seems to suggest that
marketing related strategies have either not been
considered or assumed away."
or
"Why should the first step... be to construct a flow
chart?"
or
"The team's effectiveness might improve if its com-
position were better balanced, with the addition of
some marketing personnel."
In general, it was felt that some problem assumptions and inputs
should be examined more closely, and questioned in order to proceed to
a more effective "structuring" of the risk analysis model. It was
agreed that the listing of assumptions in Exhibit 2, and the sensitivity
analysis in Chart 2, provided a valuable starting point.
In relation to the assumptions in Exhibit 2, some further observa-
tions were made. First, why did the CCA team assume that they will
produce their own sheets of foam when the option of purchasing from an
outside source might be a worthwhile alternative? Second, what addi-
tional correlation effects (with their attendant measurement complica-
tions) should be included in the model in relation to price elasticity,
demand, production rates, etc.? Third, why were market decisions taken
more or less as given, thus reducing CCA's decision to an apparent
choice between one of four production strategies?
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After considerable discussion, it was agreed that the greatest
weakness concerned the marketing assumptions adopted in the model, and
the level of empirical or research effort available to support these
assumptions. Listed below are some of the areas in marketing which
were questioned.
- Market share will be 10% by 1978. (Should there be a spread
of possible values?)
- No manufacturer other than Diamond National will come in
before 1978.
- Paper carton manufacturers will not react violently to their
share being cut in ten years from 50% to 5%. (Why would they
not start a price war? Could they afford to do so?)
- Pricing must be at Pillopost level. Why not consider the
adoption of penetration pricing policies?
- Market forecasts are assumed correct. Has any attempt been
made to check their forecast accuracy?
- Selling will be done by the plastics marketing department. It
would appear that the transfer price will become an important
motivating factor, and might indicate that a separate department
for marketing Egg'N Foam in the carton market should be established.
Two other financial management assumptions were seen to require
further justification. First, that working capital cannot be regarded
as a certain need. The amount required will depend upon the accuracy
of demand predictions (e.g., a stock pile-up might occur), the speed of
payments by debtors and many other, as yet unknown, factors. Second,
the influence of inflation cannot be ignored. It may hit foam harder
-16-
than pulp, or vice-versa, seriously changing the competitive balance
within CCA.
Specificity and Clarity of Objectives
The management felt that the project team were uncertain about the
criteria by which choice should be made in relation to the available
strategies. It was suggested, therefore, that attention should be
directed towards the criterion for strategy choice in relation to CCA's
overall portfolio of investments, both current and projected. The main
concern was to relate project risk to the firm's overall risk, and to
handle strategic issues. For example, the issue of whether the CCA
Egg'N Foam project would be too risky, not only in the sense of varia-
bility of returns, but also in terms of its effect on the firm's port-
folio of projects. Senior managers commented that the carton project
might focus too great a proportion of the company's resources (finan-
cial, managerial, production, and marketing) on a single project to the
detriment of other possible alternatives.
Conclusions of the Initial Policy Dialogue
It was agreed that certain tasks could be better performed by
management than by the project team. It was suggested that the project
team, (perhaps better balanced with additional marketing and financial
expertise), should generate appropriate alternative strategies in line
with management policy, and subsequently carry out some form of strate-
gic evaluation using risk measures agreed jointly with management.
Management's task should be to define the range of strategies to be
-17-
considered, to direct the project group in the decision-making task,
and to determine the final strategy choice, perhaps in a dialogue pro-
cess involving the consideration of other factors and attributes.
It should be emphasized that both groups stressed the importance of
management's role in the problem finding and formulation process. It
was felt that the current strategy set had an overly production/R & D
character. Also, it was agreed that the range of strategies for con-
sideration should focus on a close scan of the environment as well as a
screen of potential competitive market and technological uncertainties.
As a result, the following recommendations were made concerning
further strategy formulation and evaluation through the analytic process.
First, that greater attention should be paid to the influence of compe-
tition, competitive reaction and marketing forces on the Egg'N Foam
decision. In other words, marketing/production mix combination
strategies should be developed. Management felt that the most sensible
approach would be to develop a number of marketing scenarios (using a
Delphi-type approach), and if appropriate, carry out a simulation of
each scenario. For example, scenarios of the following type should be
developed in association with each of the set of production alternatives,
(i) steady price;
(ii) failure of the market to grow meaningfully;
(iii) tough competitive reaction, e^g., price war initiated by
Diamond National and others;
(iv) a price war started by CCA to discourage other market
entrants—i.e., an attempt to build-up share quickly;
(v) consumers preferring paper-based to plastic cartons.
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Second, that attention should be given in model development to
working capital and cash flow management. For example, inflation
effects and their impact on potential cash flow generation needed to
be examined thoroughly. Third, that the output of the analytic process
should be presented in terms of a series of performance measures over
the project time-horizon (15 years). This recommendation developed from
the belief that the influence of contingencies on a series of measures
such as cash flow and sales projections and NPV measures, would give
valuable input to the process of strategy choice. The performance
measures suggested were:
- Total $ sales
- Cash flow profile
- Gross profit as a percentage of sales
- Net profit after taxes
- Net profit as a return on investment
- Net present value
- Further sensitivity analysis of results to key
changes in input factors.
Subsequent Policy Dialogue
Management reviewed the subsequent output of the risk analysis
which showed that Strategy 1 (super-fast) was still dominant, except
under adverse marketing and financial scenarios, when Strategy 2 would
be preferred. Interestingly, it was also determined (from the
marketing scenarios), that CCA had a competitive strength with the
plastic carton. As a result, if it adopted an even more aggressive
-19-
capaclty-building strategy, it would be able to obtain both the domi-
nant market share position, and hence the lowest relative cost position.
This information provided an additional interesting discussion topic.
The management group commented upon the usefulness of the marketing
and financial (e.g., cash flow) probabilistic forecasts provided by the
"second-pass" risk simulation. Quite apart from better understanding
the influence of uncertain events on their business activities, they
felt that it gave them an insight into the "spin-off" from this project
to the firm's entire portfolio.
As the project's NPV (for Strategies I and II) was positive when
discounted at the required risk adjusted rate (determined from modern
capital-asset pricing theories), then the project should certainly
merit acceptance in portfolio terms. This was reinforced by the stra-
tegic aspects of the risk simulation, which enabled management to judge
the project's viability under a range of alternative future scenarios.
Indeed, managers commented that the confirmatory positive indications
of the set of performance measures under the range of scenarios, enabled
them to better understand the project.
Whilst they were now generally in favor of project acceptance, they
wanted to examine CCA's goals in further detail. First, they wanted to
ensure that this project was compatible with the firm's long-term
growth plans and objectives. Second, in order to develop this strategic
thinking process, they decided to simulate the firm's portfolio over a
five to ten years horizon in terms of profitability and cash flow objec-
tives. By so doing, they hoped to anticipate other business areas with
-20-
future potential for decline/growth, and assess cash flow and financial
implications for the Egg'N Foam project.
This subsequent portfolio analysis showed sound long-term viability,
and gave strength to management's view that the growth into cartons was
a useful related-business diversification. It was felt that it would
be complementary in skills and growth potential to the firm's recent
diversifications into the poultry processing and broiler chicken manu-
facturing areas.
Summary, Conclusions, Strategic Implication
The value of risk analysis In a facilities planning decision Is
examined here in relation to a disguised recent planning situation
called Egg'N Foam. In essence, following Gluck et al [3], risk analy-
sis is presented as Stage II/III of a sensible strategic thinking
process. That is, as a vehicle for forecast/uncertainty based planning,
in which an understanding of future scenarios, cash flow projections,
and synergies between marketing and production activities is developed.
This also enables managers to search more creatively in order to iden-
tify the menu of strategic options.
The strategic risk analysis presented here differs from that pre-
sented by some other authors in the same area [e.g., Spetzler and
Zamora [6]; Buffa [2]] in terms of its treatment of risk preference and
criteria for strategy choice. Risk preference involves the decision-
maker's attitude towards risk, and is commonly handled via utility
function assessment and certainty equivalence concepts. In this
instance, the management group felt uncomfortable with the utility
-21-
concept, even though they regarded risk preference as a policy question.
They preferred to treat risk preference through a number of "lenses,"
i.e., by examining the risk simulation output in mean/ variance terms,
in terms of "risk of ruin" criteria (i.e., prob NPV > 0), and by
looking at future cash flow profiles. In addition, they accepted that
a project with a positive NPV, when discounted at a "risk-adjusted"
rate, would increase the value of the firm in portfolio terras.
Management also felt that for strategy choice, both the project and
the firm's portfolio should be examined in terms of a number of perfor-
mance measures (cash flow, NPV, sales) specified over the fifteen-year
project time horizon. This criterion of policy choice, specified in
terms of a time stream of indicator measures (cash flow etc.) rather
than in terms of a single criterion (such as expected utility), is con-
sistent with the work on preferences over time (see Bell [1] and Meyer
[5]).
In terms of strategic implementation, this risk analysis approach
was successful. This was because of the value of risk analysis In
encouraging policy dialogue amongst the management group about future
uncertainty impacts. The continued questioning of assumptions and
problem formulation is seen as essential for the effective formulation
and evaluation of alternative strategy positions. By such continued
questioning and dialogue, a meaningful consensus about strategy choice
emerged. This consensus process, which involved "three passes" of a
risk analysis process, could not have been achieved without adaptive
mechanisms and flexibility being built into the process during the
course of dialogue and successive risk analysis passes.
-22-
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EGGN FOAM
EXHIBIT I
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MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING EGG' N FOAM PROJECTIONS
PRICE
1. Foam cartons will sell at the Pillopost price level
2. Pillopost prices are expected to decline over the years
3. Market volume for foam cartons will drop sharply at prices above
Pillopost level
4. Diamond National will be the price leader; price competition will be moderate
5. Price-volume discount schedule is unlikely to change significantly over the
next decade
6. No transfer price for foam is considered
SELLING EXPENSES
1. Egg'N Foam distribution will be handled by the Plastics Division's Marketing
Department
2. Selling costs include:
— Unrecovered charges (design and plates, speculative art work,
customer machinery)
— Supplies
— Dues and subscriptions
— Advertising and promotion
3. There will be cne-time startup cost
MARKET SHARE
i
1. The market under consideration is the potential number of foam egg cartons sold
through existing channels of distribution in four regions (West Co3st is excluded)
2. CCA will be able to produce a high-quality foam carton which is acceptable to
customers and will close satisfactorily on existing egg packers' machines
3. Product characteristics of Egg'N Foam will be competitive to Pillopost
4. CCA can successfully sell foam egg cartons through existing channels of distribution
(to each type of customer in the market)
5. CCA's sales volume will be penalized by building plants in later years
6. CCA will sell out a plant's capacity regardless of when the plant is built
7. CCA will have captured 10 percent of the assumed carton
market by 1978 {360 million cartons).
8. No additional carton suppliers are expected to become a significant factor in
the egg carton market in the next 10 years
before 1978 as opposed to considerably lowering their pulp carton pr:css
10. Colored foam will not be a factor in the market before 1978
1 1
.
CCA will equalize freight paid by customers when foam cartons are shipped into
other regions
DIRECT COSTS
1. Significant cost savings can be achieved by building super plants
2. No major changes will take place in the manufacturing concept
3. In an Egg'N Foam plant no other products than foam egg cartons will be produced
4. CCA will produce its own foam sheets
5. CCA foam will have uniform quality and density characteristics
6. Throughput rates of the extruder and thermoformer will improve over time due
to advancements in desigrvand manufacturing knowledge
7. Inflation in future years has been excluded since it should affect both revenues
and costs
SIZE OF CARTON MARKET
!
1. U.S.D.A. statistics on egg production by state are correct
2. Estimates from the editor of the Poultry Tribune are correct on eggs cartoned
as percentage of total egg production
3. Statistics of U.S. Economics Corporation are correct
m. Toial market is divided into five regions determined by:
- Probabie organization of CCA field sales force
— Size of areas where a 10 percent share would be the
equivalent of a small size plant
5. Foam will have better merchandising appeal than pulp or paper and therefore
10 years
,
6. rty 1978, share of market by carton type will have changed as follows:
- Paperboard from 45% to 5%
- Pulp from 53% to 50%
C — -— * in/ *- AC<\t
i
CONTINUING COSTS
1. Straight-line depreciation is used for calculating the return on investment. Double
declining balances are used for calculating depreciation for tax pu;poses and the
discounted cash flows
2. Life of the equipment is equivalent to standards allowed by the Internal Revenue
Service
- Building 30 years
- Production equipment 7 years
- Trucks 5 years
EXHIBIT III
FIXED INPUT DATA - EGG'ISI FOAM
RISK ANALYSIS MODEL
YIELD PERCENTAGES
Extruder garbage loss: 1 .0%
Extruder recbirr.able scrap: 7.0%
Thcrmoforrner mold loss: 1.0% Printer loss: 2.5%
Thcrmoformer buttends loss: 1.0% Printer reclaimable scrap: 1.5%
Thermoformer reclaimable scrap: 13.0%
EFFICIENCIES
Mechanical efficiency
Scheduling efficiency
EXTRUDER
so%
95%
THERMOFORMER
90%
100%
MATERIAL PRICES
Foam pellets: $0.15/lb.
Supplies: $1.01 /thousand cartons
MANUFACTURING COSTS'
ONE EXTRUDER TWO EXTRUDERS
pvtt linur miroMu ^<-*«-+r £•* r_- nc
Therrnofcrrricr variable coots 22.21 38.94
Continuing costs $237,350 $393,600
* The cost for three thermoformers is equal to the cost for one plus the cost for two.
The cost for four thcrmoformers is equal to twice the cost of two.
MANUFACTURING PROCESS
Extruders will work on a four-shift basis (7-day week); thermoforrners on a three-shift basis (5-day week)
EQUIPMENT SPEEDS AND
SPECIFICATIONS
19GS 19S9 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Price/thousand cartons
$26.00 S25.50 $25.00 $24.50 $24.00 S28.50 $23.00
52C.SO $27.00 $26.90 $26.80 $26.70 $26.60 $26.50
Extruder Rate (Ib./hr.) 420-600 520-700
Caliper (inches) .0S0-.037 .078-.087
Thcrmoformer Cycle Time"
(seconds) 6.0-4.5 6.0-3.0
>
Thcrmoformers will use o twclve-uo mold
EGG CARTON MARKET 1966
3.5 billion cartons
1978
4.7 billion canons
Continuing costs include:
— Plant overhead
— Office expenses
— Property tax
— Mold amortization
— Depreciation
— Other production
expenses
Direct com include:
— Material
— Labor
— Supplies
— Utilities
— Maintenance
Selling costs include:
— Sales force salaries
— Payroll taxes, employee
benefits
— Travel and entertainment
(25% of salaries)
— Telephone and telegraph
— Office rent
— Unrecovered charges
— Supplies
— Dues and subscriptions
AdvOf t Kino :inrt nrnmnt I
A small plant sales force includes:
-- 1/2 sales manager
— 3 salesmen
— 2 packaging machinery service
A large plant sales force would
include:
— 1 sales manager
— 5 salesmen
— 3 packaging machinery
service
EXICQIT IV
PROBABILITIES ASSIGNED TO MAJOR INPUT FACTORS
CHART 1
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VARIABLE INPUT DATA - EGG'N FOAM
RISK ANALYSIS MODEL
STRATEGY: SUPER FAST
A-
plant location: Nesquchoning
Year
Building Equipment Trucks
Working
Capital
No.
Extruders
No.
Thermo-
formers
Selling
Expenr.es
Mean
Dormnd
Standard
Deviation
($000) (MOO) Carton Millions
1 720 G71 20 250.0 1 1 . 70.0 22 30
2 120 201.2 1 1Vi 121.7 41 30
3 720 701 10 401 2 2 3% 180.0 86 30
4 2 4 204.1 134 30
5 2 4 204.1 180 30
6 2 4 204.1 180 30
7 2 4 204.1 130 30
3 2 4 204.1 180 30
9 2 4 204.1 180 30
10 2 4 204.1 180 30
11
-
r> n o •
I
™
i
rt 2 4 204.1 ISO 30
13 n 2 '4 204.1 180 SO
14 2 4 204.1 180 30
15 2 4 204.1 180 30
plant location: Cairo
Year
Building Equipment Trucks
Working
Capital
NoT
E>riruders
No.
Thcrmo-
foi rr.ers
Selling
Expenses
t/ean
E errand
Standard
Deviation
(S000) (SOOO) Carton Millions
1 ' 30
2 Q, ( 30
3 720 791 20 451.2 % ' Y> 70.0 9 30
4 720 701 10 401.2 Hi 3 180.0 54 30
5 2 4 204.1 115 30
6 2 4 204.1 139 30
7 2 4 204.1 180 30
8 2 4 204.1 180 30
9 2 4 204.1 180 30
10 - 2 4 204.1 180 30
11 2 4 204.1 • 180 30 -
12 1 2 4 204.1 180 30
13 2 4 204.1 180 30
14 2 4 204.1 180 30
15 2 4 204.1 180 30
VARIABLE INPUT DATA - EGG'N POAM
RISK ANALYSIS MODEL
STRATEGY: SUPER SLOW
A-2
plant location: Nesquehoning
Working Selling Mean Standard
Duilding Equipment Trucks Capital
No
No. Expenses Demand Deviation
Year iSCOO) Extruders formers ($000) Canon Millions
1 720 07
1
20 250.0 1 1 70.0 22 10
2 50.0 1 1 100.0 35 10
3 120 151.2 1 2 121.7 54 10
4 720 501 10 250.0 VA TA 150.0 79 10
5 120 1512 2 4 204.1 106 10
G 2 4 204.
1
133 10
7 2 4 204.1 180 10
8 2 4 204.1 180 10
9 o o 2 4 204.1 130 10
in . ! c n -, *o_r» i« !
r
,i . 2 204.1 180 10
12 2 4 204.1 180 10
13 2 4 204.1 1D0 10
14 2 4 204.1 180 10
15 " 2 A 204.i iSO iu
plant location: Cairo
Year
Ouildina Eciuioment Trucks
Working
Capital
No.
Extruders
No.
The.rrno-
formers
Selling
Exicns's
Mean
Demrnd
Standard
Deviation
(S000) (£000) Canon Millions
1 10
2 10
3 10
4 10
5 720 791 20 451.2 1 r/j 100.0 16 10
6 1 2 121.7 50 10
7 720 701 10 401.2 2 3'/, 180.0 78 10
8 2 4 204.1 102 10
9 2 4 204.1 126 10
10 2 4 204.1 160 10
11 2 4 204.1 180 10
12 2 4 204.1 180 10
13 2 4 204.1 180 10
14 2 4 204.1 180 10
15 2 4 204.1 180 10
VARIABLE INPUT DATA - EGG'N FOAM
RISK ANALYSIS MODEL
STRATEGY: SMALL FAST
plant location: Ncsquchoninq
~1
Working Soiling Uenn Standard
Building Equipment Truck
i
CfiDltBl
No.
Extruders
No.
Thermo-
formers
Expsniu Dcnnnd Deviation
Year (£0001 (50001 Carton Millions
1 720 G71 20 2b'J.O 1 yu.6 21 21
2 120 201.2 1% 121.7 41 21
3 2 121.7 57 21
4 . 2 121.7 90 21
5 2 121.7 90 21
6 2 121.7 90 21
7 2 121.7 90 21
8 2 121.7 • 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
10 2 121.7 90 21
11 2 121.7 90 21
J 2 2 121.7 90 21
13 2 121.7 90 21
14 o 121.7 90 21
15 2 121.7 90 21
1
PLANT LOCATION: ScuthCHSt
1
2
3 720 791 20 451.2 VA
A n 1 2
h o o 0{ 1 12
<j 2
7 0. ,2
8 2
9 2
10 2
11 2
12 2
13 o n 2
14 2
15 2
100.0
121.7
121.7
121.7
121.7
121.7
121.7
121.7
121.7
121.7
121 7
121.7
121.7
27
62
CO
90
90
90
90
SO
SO
90
50
90
90
PLANT LOCAT IOM: Midi vest
1 21
2 o- 21
3 720 671 20 300.0 54 y, 50 .0 9 21
4 120 151.2 4. 121.7 40 21
5 2 121.7 70 21
6 2 121.7 90 21
7 f 2 121.7 90 21
8 2 121.7 90 21
9 2 121.7 90 21
10 2 121.7 90 21
11 2 121.7 90 21
12 2 121.7 90 21
13 0- 2 121.7 90 21
14 2 121.7 90 21
15 2 121.7 90 21
PLANT LOCATION: SouthWBSt
1 -
2
3
4 720 791 20
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
21
21
21-
451.2 VA 100.0 21 21
2 121.7 57 21
2 121.7 71 21
2 121.7 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
2 121.7 90 21
n •> ni 7 nn 2J
VAUIADLE INPUT DATA - EGG'N FOAM
RISK ANALYSIS MODEL
STRATEGY: SMALL SLOW
A-4
plant location: Nnsquclwnir.n
'.Vorkins Gelling Moon Standard 1
Buildinq Equipment Trucks C-Tpitcl
No.
Extruders
No. Expenses Denvind Deviation
> ear C-OOOI formers (JCOOI Carton Millions
1 720 G71 20 2500 1 70.0 21 7
2 50.0 1 70.0 36 7
3 120 151.2 2 121.7 54 7
4 o • 2 121.7 72 7
5 2 121.7 90 7
6 2 121.7 90 7
7 2 121.7 90 7
8 2 121.7 90 7
9 0. 2 121.7 90 7
10 2 121.7 SO 7
11 2 121.7 90 7
12 2 121.7 90 7
M3 2 121.7 90 7
14 2 121.7 90 7
15 2 121.7 90 7
PLANT LOCATION: Southcast
1 7
|
•2 7
3 o '
i 720 G71 20 300.0 /2 1//7 70.0 7 7 I
I
s u i20 G *i u 1 .2 • ' 1 2 1 .7 o-* / i
b u KJ u o > £ i4i./ ou /
7 u o. ' /. 1 2 1 .7 90 /
8 1 2 121.7 90 7
9 1 2 121.7 90 7
10 1 2 121.7 SO 7
11 1 2 121.7 90 7
12 1 2 121.7 90 7
*3 1 n 1° 1 7 rtrt 7
14 1 2 121.7 90 7
15
i .. .
1 2 121.7 90 7
PLANT LOCATION: h'luV.'i. zt
1 7
2 7
3 7
4 0- 7
5 720 C71 20 300.0 1 70.0 16 7
6 120 151.2 1VS 100.0 50 7
7 2 121.7 63 7
8 2 121.7 SO 7
9 2 121.7 90 7
10 2 121.7 90 7
11 2 121.7 SO 7
12 2 121.7 so 7
13 2 121.7 90 7
14 ' 2 121.7 SO 7
15 2 121.7 90 7
PLANT LOCATION: South west
1
2
3 7 •
4
5
6
7 720 07
1
20 300.0 K V, 100.0 3
8 120 151.2 2 121.7 18
9 2 121.7 42
10 2 121.7 66
11 2 121.7 90
12 2 121.7 90
13 2 121.7 CO
14
° •> ->
2 121.7 SO 7
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